There are severe inequalities in health in the world, poor health being concentrated amongst poor people in poor countries. Poor countries spend a much smaller share of national income on health expenditure than do richer countries. What potential lies in political or growth processes that raise this share? This depends upon how effective government health spending in developing countries is. Existing research presents little evidence of an impact on childhood mortality. Using specifications similar to those in the existing literature, this paper finds a similar result for India, which is that state health spending saves no lives. However, upon allowing lagged effects, controlling in a flexible way for trended unobservables and restricting the sample to rural households, a significant effect of health expenditure on infant mortality emerges, the long run elasticity being about -0.24. There are striking differences in the impact by social group. Slicing the data by gender, birth-order, religion, maternal and paternal education and maternal age at birth, I find the weakest effects in the most vulnerable groups (with the exception of a large effect for scheduled tribes).
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Spending to Save?
State Health Expenditure and Infant Mortality in India 1. Introduction
Motivation and Context
Inequalities in life expectancy across and within countries are created mainly by variation in childhood mortality. In poor countries, 30% of deaths are amongst children, compared with less than 1% in rich countries (Cutler et al. 2005, p.15) . As many as 10 million children under the age of five die each y ear, mainly from preventable (or curable) conditions that seldom kill children in rich countries (Jones et al. 2003 ). Yet most of the relevant interventions, such as immunization or oral rehydration therapy, are very low-cost (e.g. Deaton 2006b ). This suggests that it is not just a question of raising incomes, but of the effective delivery of publicly provided health services. In this paper the effectiveness of public intervention (state health expenditure) is measured in terms of its impact on infant mortality, or death in the first year of life.
The analysis is conducted for India, which accounts for one in four of under-5 deaths, one in three of the poor and one in six of the population in the world. On account of its size, it has the highest child death toll in the world: 2.4 million underfive deaths , and infant deaths account for more than two-thirds of these. Infant mortality is regarded as a sensitive indicator of the availability, utilisation and effectiveness of healthcare, and it is commonly used for monitoring and designing population and health programmes (The Tribune, 2002) . Like the United States, India has a federal political structure, and health is a "state subject", which means that the level and allocation of health expend iture are decided at the state level.
Analyses of the historical decline in childhood mortality rates in today's industrialised countries suggest that important drivers of this decline were improved nutrition, public health, and medical technological progress (see Fogel 2004 , Cutler and Miller 2005 , Cutler et al. 2006 . Improved nutrition tends to be associated with growth in income. Medical progress may, in principle, diffuse across geographic boundaries with no tight connection to incomes or public expenditure. Improvements in education, water and sanitation, immunization and targeted programmes against diseases like malaria and diarrhoea tend to be associated with growth in public spending.
In assessing the role that public spending might play in bringing down childhood death in poor countries, it is important to disentangle its effects from those of other trended variables, in particular, income growth and scientific progress. This is done here by investigating the impact on infant mortality of fluctuations in health expenditure around a state-specific trend. Although the conventional wisdom is that fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical, smoothing the effects of income shocks (Lane 2003) , in practice it is often pro-cyclical in developing countries (Woo 2005) .
At the same time, aggregate income volatility is much greater in poor than in rich countries (Pritchett 2000, Koren and Tenreyro 2007) . In these circumstances, we may expect that mortality is counter-cyclical, with adverse shocks to household income being reinforced by cut s in social expenditure. For the Indian sample analysed here, this is the case (Bhalotra 2007) . This paper isolates the impact on mortality of changes in state health expenditure, holding constant state income. The effect I identify is therefore the effect of changes in the share of state income that is dedicated to health. This may vary, for example, in response to health shocks (natural disasters, rainfall variation, epidemics), inequality (Woo 2005) , the political climate in the state, and the salience of public health.
I use individual data on mortality derived from retrospective fertility histories recorded in a national sample survey and merged by birth-cohort with a twenty-nine year panel of data on state health expenditure, income and other variables. The individual data are, in this way, "nested" in a state-year panel. The main contributions of this paper over the existing literature lie in its exploiting sub-national panel data on health expenditure to identify its impact, and its use of individual data on mortality to investigate heterogeneity in this impact by social group. Let me elaborate each. Most previous studies use a single section of cross-country data (see section 1.2). They are therefore unable to control for unobservable trends in medical technology which have been important in driving mortality reduction, and omission of which will tend to bias the estimated effects of health expenditure.
1 Cross-country regressions are also prone to other forms of correlated heterogeneity which, in a panel, are absorbed by state fixed effects. A further advantage of using a panel and, especially, a long panel, is that 4 dynamics can be explored. No previous research in this domain appears to have explored dynamics and, here, I show that this is critical. This is also the first study in this area that controls for correlated weather shocks, omission of which will generate spurious co-variation of mortality and health expenditure. Only a couple of previous studies have examined heterogeneity in the impact of health expenditure on health outcomes and, this, by (simulated) income groups (Gupta et al 2003, Bidani and Ravallion 1997) . This study investigates heterogeneity by observed individual and family characteris tics. This is interesting in itself but it also provides insight into the mechanisms by which health expenditure has an impact, if any.
Using specifications similar to those in the existing literature, I find the result highlighted in the literature, which is that state health spending saves no lives (see Filmer and Pritchett 1999) . However, restricting the sample to rural households (more than two-thirds of all) and conditioning upon state-specific trends, a significant effect emerges that is driven by the third lag of health expenditure. The long run marginal effect is -0.023 and, with average mortality in the sample at about 9.5%, the elasticity is -0.24. A one standard deviation (0.48) increase in log health expenditure per capita at a given level of state income is estimated to reduce the risk of mortality by 1% which, taking a UN estimate of live births in India in 1990 of 26.3 million, amounts to saving 0.26 million lives.
There are striking differences in the impact of health expenditure by social group. The impact is greater for rural and scheduled tribe households than for urban or higher-caste households. This is consistent with more remotely located people benefiting from marginal increases in health expenditure. However, slicing the data by gender, birth-order, religion, mother's and father's education and maternal age at birth, I find weaker effects in the mo re vulnerable groups. I argue that this may be related to the way in which health expenditure is used. Previous studies that have looked at the distribution of health expenditure effects have focused on income. The effects I find suggest that attitudes and information, which may not be strongly correlated with income, mediate the effects of state spending.
Related Literature
When Peru's GDP fell in 1987-90 by 30%, government health expenditure fell by 58%, its budget-share falling from 4.3 to 3%. At the same time, infant mortality spiked, rising by 2.5 percentage points (Paxson and Schady 2005) . While this is one of the most persuasive analyses in the literature, describing trends broken by a big exogenous shock, it is difficult to generalise from. In particular, changes in health expenditure might impact mortality only when they are very large. There is limited evidence on the health effects of year to year fluctuations in state health spending since most previous studies have used a single section of cross-country data.
In an influential study, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) investigate the effect of government health expenditure on infant and under-5 mortality using cross-sectional data on 98 developing countries in 1992/3. They find a very small and statistically insignificant effect. They show that 95% of the variation in mortality between countries is explained by income per capita, income inequality, female education, ethnic fractionalisation, and whether the country is more than 90% Muslim. This is an important study with striking results. But the results are not incontrovertible. Using data for 50 developing and transition countries observed in 1994, Gupta et. al. (2002) find some evidence that government health expenditure is negatively correlated with childhood mortality, but they show that this relationship is not robust. Using crosssectional data for 22 developing countries in 1985, Anand and Ravallion (1993) find that health expenditure raises life expectancy and that, conditional upon this, income has no effect. All of these studies suffer two important limitations, which the authors recognise. First, data on both mortality and government health expenditure are unlikely to be comparable across countries. Second, the estimates in these studies are subject to bias on account of unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated with the variable of interest (see Durlauf et al. 2005 ). The present study addresses the first problem by using sub-national data, and the second problem by using panel data on state health expenditure and income.
There is some relevant recent work for India (Deolalikar 2005 
The Data
The micro-data are derived from the second round of the Nationa l Family A strength of the mortality data is that they are annual and cover a long period. This is unusual (see Pritchett and Summers 1996) . However, they have their weaknesses. The rest of this section discusses the way in which these potential problems are addressed. As the microdata are constructed from retrospective fertility histories, they are wedge-shaped, there being fewer observations for children born earlier in time. Moreover, the thinning of the data does not occur randomly, but is a function of maternal age at birth. I therefore condition upon maternal age at birth.
Another issue that arises with retrospective data is that the mother may have migrated between states between the birth of the index child and the date of interview.
However the survey asks the mother how long she has lived in her current location.
Using this information, the analysis is restricted to the 85.1% of births that occurred in the mother's current location, so that we can be confident that infant mortality risk is related to health expenditure in the state in which the child was born. As a (rough) check on whether this sample selection is endogenous, I compared estimates on the restricted and unrestricted samples, and found that they were not significantly different. The conventional definition of infant death is death before the first birthday of the child. Since mother's reports of age at death of their children exhibit ageheaping at six-monthly intervals, infancy is defined here to include the twelfth month.
The results are not sensitive to this difference, but the inclusive definition is retained since this increases the ratio of ones to zeroes in the dependent variable. 8
Descriptive Statistics
To obtain descriptives, I aggregated the individual data to the state level using sampling weights. The aggregation is done by birth cohort, yielding a straightforward panel in which state mortality rates can be related to state health expenditure. Figure 5 shows that the raw relationship between mortality and health expenditure is negative in most states. Figure 6 plots these data after removing statespecific trends. In the de-trended data, it is unclear that increases in health expenditure are associated with decreases in mortality. The rest of this paper explores whether these simple associations persist after conditioning upon other covariates, and allowing for lagged effects. 
The Empirical Model
The baseline model is 9
(1) M The model is estimated as a probit. All reported standard errors are robust and clustered by state. These adjustments allow for conditional heteroskedasticity and for conditional autocorrelation within states (see Bertrand et al 2004, Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p.788) . Note that adjusting for clustering at the state-level takes care of any lower-level clustering such as at the community or mother-level. Identification of β relies upon there being independent fluctuations in health expenditure within states.
The relatively long time dimension of the data makes it more likely that this is the case.
X includes dummies for gender and birth-month of the child, age of mother at birth of the child, levels of education of each of mother and father, and ethnicity and religion of the household. These characteristics have been shown to be significant predictors of mortality risk in a number of previous studies, and also in India (e.g.
Bhalotra and van Soest 2007). Z includes income inequality measured as the log of
the Gini coefficient for each of the rural and urban sectors, poverty measured as the log of the sector-specific headcount ratio, the ratio of the log of agricultural to nonagricultural income in the state, inflation in consumer prices and a quadratic in newspaper circulation per capita.
Rainfall shocks are measured as the absolute deviation of rainfall in each stateyear from its 30-year state-mean. A positive shock is defined as equal to this deviation when it is positive, and zero otherwise. A negative shock is symmetrically defined.
These are the terms that appear in the regressions. Since health expenditure, the regressor of interest, varies by state-year, we cannot, of course, include state-year dummies to control comprehensively for statespecific health shocks. As a result, health expenditure remains potentially endogenous.
Consider, for example, that a particular state suffers a flood or a drought. Suppose that, 6 A natural alternative to using absolute deviations is to use the z-score of rainfall which normalises deviations with respect to the standard deviation in the state. The specification used here allows a big deviation in rainfall to impact infant mortality as much in a state that often experiences rainfall fluctuations as it would in a state with a more stable weather pattern. This seems to me the more relevant specification, but I have confirmed that using z-scores does not alter the main results of this analysis.
as a result, more infants die, and the state reacts by raising health expenditure. 8 This will create a positive association of infant mortality and health expenditure in the data.
To purge the data of this, I control in a flexible way for rainshocks. These are probably the most important sorts of health (and income) shocks given that most infant deaths are rural and rural households are more likely to be engaged in agriculture, and more likely to live in areas with poor sanitation where rainfall variation can directly affect disease epidemiology. I nevertheless also control for other state-level variables, omission of which may drive a spurious correlation between health expenditure and mortality. For instance, Woo (2005) argues that fiscal policy may be influenced by inequality; so inequality is one of the variables in the vector Z in equation (1). I also estimate a model in which current health expenditure is replaced by its first four lags. This makes it even less likely that the expenditure coefficient is biased by state-specific shocks that are not controlled for. Section 5.1 discusses substantive reasons to include lags.
Since the key regressor (state health expenditure) varies at the state and not the individual level, t he data are a bit scarce for estimation of state-specific models.
However, to gain at least an indicative sense of the state-specific relationships, I also estimate the following simple linear model for each state (T=28):
The notation is the same as in equation (1).
Results
Henceforth health expenditure refers to the logarithm of real per capita state health expenditure and income refers to the logarithm of real per capita net domestic product of the state. Table 1 presents marginal effects estimated from a probit f or infant mortality (equation 1) using a (log)linear term in current health expenditure, a quadratic, and a first lag. The results for urban households show that health expenditure has no effect on infant mortality, whatever the specification and that income is also insignificant once year dummies are inc luded in the model (Table 1B) . Infant mortality rates are higher in rural households and they are, on average, poorer and tend to have lower private expenditure on health and nutrition. We may therefore expect that state health expenditure is more effective for the rural sample. These results are in Table 1A .
Static Models
Although the unconditional correlation of mortality and health expenditure is now significant (-0.015), there is no effect once time effects are included. This result is unchanged if current expenditure is replaced by its first lag, but the second panel of Table 1A shows some evidence of (poorly-determined) non-linearity. It is interesting to see that mortality risk is hump-shaped in health expenditure, the relation turning negative at high levels of expenditure, with a marginal effect at the mean of -0.020. A possible explanation of this shape is that, at low levels of expenditure, most of it goes to politically prioritised areas such as curative care in urban areas, with bigger budgets extend ing to lower-priority areas such as preventive care, water supply or sanitation that are more likely to impact mortality at the margin (see Lanjouw and Ravallion 1999) . I also investigated a specification in which health expenditure was interacted with income ( as i n Deolalikar 2005). The interaction term was negative but insignificant; these results are not displayed.
Marginal effects of income are also reported in Table 1 . In the absence of controls for omitted trends, income has a significant marginal effect of -0.05 on rural mortality risk. Although this effect vanishes upon including time dummies (as did the health expenditure effect), it re-establishes itself (ME of -0.04) upon inclusion of state-specific trends (which health expenditure did not). 9 Dropping income raises the marginal effect of health expenditure but does not alter its significance level.
Rainshocks and micro-demographic variables are jointly significant, but dropping them from the model does not alter the health expenditure elasticity. Some of the state-level controls are significant but, again, conditioning upon them does not make a significant difference to the health expenditure effect. Each of the sets of state dummies, year dummies and state-specific trends is jointly significant at the 1% l evel in every specification in which they appear. As we have seen, the results are sensitive 13 to conditioning upon time dummies and state-specific trends. The results are not sensitive to the choice of estimator. The linear probability model yields a similar pattern of results. Adjusting the standard errors for clustering by state increases them by about 43% (see Table A4 in the online appendix-refer footnote 5). The main conclusion of this section is that health expenditure ha s no effect on infant mortality once common time-varying unobservables are removed. Although the further specifications discussed below were estimated for both samples, there is no case in which health expenditure is significant for urban households. From here on, all reported results are therefore for the rural sample.
State-Specific Estimates of the Static Model
It is possible that these negative results conceal some significant state-specific slopes. To investigate this, I estimated state-specific models using the time series (equation 2). Results are in Table A3 in the online appendix. Health expenditure has a significant negative effect in three of the fifteen states (Assam, Maharashtra, West Bengal). If I drop state-specific trends, health expenditure is significantly negative in five states: Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
These five states do not form a natural group in terms of being, for example, poorer, or more politically liberal. In contrast, the states that show a negative effect of income are the poorer, higher mortality states.
Distributed Lag Model
Although controlling for fixed effects and rainfall shocks removes some important sources of correlated unobserved heterogeneity, it remains possible that there are other state-specific health shocks that raise (or lower) both infant mortality and health expenditure, as a result of which the estimated coefficient on health expenditure will tend to carry a positive bias. This bias may be dominating an underlying negative causal effect in the results we have seen so far. I therefore investigated a distributed lag model that allows four lags of health expenditure. Using lags breaks any contemporaneous correlation between mortality and expenditure that is driven by an omitted variable, and it allows for the possibility that causal effects take time to play out. It is natural to allow the same lags for income.
The main effects are in Table 2 ; covariate effects are in Table A5 in the online appendix. Every column includes micro-demographics, rainfall shocks, state and time 14 dummies and state-specific trends. Results are displayed with and without controlling for state-level variables. In the absence of state-trends, the inclusion of state-level covariates raises the coefficients on health expenditure and income, but it makes little difference once state-trends are included. The main finding is that the third lag of health expenditure and the third and fourth lags of income are significant. As this specification is asking rather a lot of the data, Table 3 reports estimates of a more parsimonious model that retains only the significant terms from the fourth-order lag specification. Now the marginal effect of health expenditure is -0.023 and the long run elasticity is -0.21. The long run income elasticity, at -0.28, is bigger. The effects of both health expenditure and income are sensitive to exclusion of the state-specific trends (see Table 3 ).
Replacing current with lagged values does not make a dramatic difference to the long run income effect, but it makes an important difference to the health expenditure effect (compare Tables 1A and 3) . Health expenditure appears insignificant in most standard specifications, consistent with much of the existing literature. However, a sufficiently flexible model reveals a highly significant effect driven by the third lag of expenditure. What might explain this? Most infant death occurs in the first month and even the first week of life, and it is well known that the proximate cause of this is low birth-weight which, in turn, is largely explained by poor maternal health. So one lag may simply denote the importance of health expenditure in the year before birth (e.g. antenatal care). Since the first lag is not significant, it seems that there are further dynamics in the process. An example of a mechanism that may generate longer lags is state dependence in mortality within families. If a drop in state expenditure three years ago killed a sibling of the index child then this, in turn, may have a causal effect on the death risk of the index child (see Arulampalam and Bhalotra 2007) . Alternatively, it may take longer than a year for increases in health spending to reach the ground.
To summarise the results so far, it is only when we restrict the sample to rural households, allow lags, and condition upon state-specific trends that a significant impact of health expenditure emerges. A possible explanation is that health expenditure is endogenous, and that this endogeneity is being limited by factoring out state-specific trends, and by lagging health expenditure. As for the rural-urban difference, it is well-known that failing to allow for heterogeneity can obscure important relationships in sub-populations. The estimated effects are likely to be conservative both because the surve y only records births of mothers who survive until the survey date and because it records only live births. Both forms of selection may be expected to yield a sample of relatively healthy births. 
Robustness
We have already investigated robustness t o functional form, lags, statespecific trends, rainfall shocks, state-level variables and micro-demographics. The rest of this section reports the results of further specification checks. First, I explored estimating the model on panel data by within groups (see Table 4 ). For this, t he individual mortality information (0/1) was aggregated to the state level by cohort using sampling weights. An advantage of this is that it will average out unobserved heterogeneity. The health expenditure effect is a bit larger, but insignificantly different from that obtained in the analogous model run with micro-data on mortality.
This suggests that the micro-demographic covariates in the model capture individual heterogeneity sufficiently well. Panel regressions in which the dependent variable is the log of infant mortality produce broadly similar results. I use the level rather than the log because it is more directly comparable with the baseline model estimated on individual data. 11 In the panel data specification, I allowed two lagged dependent variables to capture persistence in mortality, but these were insignificant. To investigate the hypothesis that significance of the third lag of health expenditure is in itself not meaningful but is proxying current health expenditure, I used the IVSystems estimator, instrument ing current health expenditure by its second and third lag. 12 The marginal effect is -0.015 but it is insignificant, consistent with the results in Table 1 .
Since the only significant results are for the rural sample, I replaced total state income with alternative measures of average income that are specific to the rural 10 UN statistics on mortality rates are also calculated with reference to live births. 11 If the individual-level mortality equation displayed in section 4 is cast as a linear probability model, aggregation to the state level will produce a specification in which the level (not log) of mortality is the dependent variable. Deaton (2006) argues that the interesting question is whether or not income growth causes the level of mortality to decline. He shows that evidence of such a relationship in cross-country data is much weaker than evidence of a relationship of income growth with proportional changes in mortality. If the same arguments apply when income is replaced with health expenditure (or share of), the specification estimated in this paper is the more conservative one. is not altered.
Heterogeneity by Social Group
Having found significant heterogeneity by sector (rural/urban) in the health expenditure effect, heterogeneity by social class (micro-demographics) was further investigated for the sample of rural households. This is interesting in itself and provides insight into the underlying mechanisms. It is unusual in the literature relating social expenditures and outcomes, which is dominated by cross-country data analysis (section 1). The specification estimated is that in column 3 of Table 3 and results are in Table 5 . Every slicing of the data produces a significant difference in the health expenditure effect. A general -and surprising-pattern that emerges is that health expenditure is less effective in reducing infant mortality in more vulnerable sections of society, that is, groups with relatively high mortality rates. 13 For example, the marginal effect is larger for boys, high caste children, Muslim children, higher-order births, children of educated mothers, and children born when the mother is in the relatively safe age range of 19-30 years. These differences are, of course, even larger when we look at the elasticity at the mean rather than at the marginal effect and, in most cases, health expenditure effects in the counterpart groups (girls, low caste etc) are insignificant (see Table 5 ).
The complete absence of any health expenditure effect for women with no education is striking because maternal education creates especially large differences 13 Mortality rates and the sample contribution of each group are in Table 5 . The reported percentages of children in each group will differ from, for example, census proportions of these social groups to the extent that there is differential fertility across groups. Also note that these are figures for rural India.
in mortality risk: average infant mortality of children of uneducated mothers is 10.4%, falling to 6.9% for mothers with some (non-zero) education, and to 3.5% fo r mothers with secondary or higher education. Educated mothers are likely to be better informed and so to extract a greater marginal advantage from a given level of health expenditure (see Jalan and Ravallion 2003) . Similarly, prime-aged mothers might be more aware than teenage mothers, and Muslim mothers might exercise higher standards of sanitation within the home if regular prayer is associated with the requirement of regular washing. So it seems that heterogeneity in the health expenditure effect relates to how households use public resources and not necessarily to the distribution of these resources. This is supported by the results obtained by gender and birth-order. It is unlikely that there are systematic differences in the policy environment faced by, say, boys and girls. It is more likely that households allocate resources differently across children. In the case of gender, the results are consistent with the widely documented fact of son-preference in India. In particular, Basu (1989) shows that, conditional upon being sick, boys are more likely to be taken to a treatment-centre than are girls. In the case of birth-order, the results can be rationalised in terms of learning. If the first-born dies of diarrhea, the mother is more likely to learn about Oral Rehydration Therapy and use it to avert death for subsequent children.
There are two deviations from the pattern described so far, that is, two cases in which the more vulnerable group is more responsive to health expenditure. This, of
course, is what we would expect on account of diminishing returns, and because better-off groups can afford to protect themselves against infant mortality even when state health services are weak. One case, that we have already encountered, is that health expenditure is more effective in rural than in urban areas. Mortality risk is 3.6
percentage-points higher for rural as compared to urban children. Even if health services are more sparse and variable in rural areas, there is greater scope for bringing down mortality. The other deviation is evident only when the low-caste group is subdivided into its three components, which are scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST) and "other backward classes" (OBC). State health expenditure has only small and insignificant effects on the SC and OBC groups, but it has a large negative effect on children of scheduled tribes (ST). Indeed, this is the largest marginal effect of any sub-group, about four times as large as the average effect in rural areas. The ST group are about 12% of the entire sample and 18% of the low-caste group. The infant mortality rate in the ST group is 10%, in contrast with 8.35% amongst high-caste Hindus. Scheduled tribes are thought to be the least integrated social group, historically having been isolated from community life, and tending to live in relative geographic isolation. This result is therefore quite striking.
14 Some previous studies have found bigger impacts of state health expenditure on the poor (e.g. Bidani and Ravallion 1997, Gupta et al. 2003) . As discussed in section 2, we do not have household income data. 15 Given the difficulties with measuring income for poor households (a large fraction of which are self-employed), it is useful to look at heterogeneity by other, more stable, indicators of social class.
Since rural and ST households are clearly relatively poor, there is some support in these data for the view that state health expenditure is, at the margin, more beneficial to the poor. However, uneducated rural women are poor, and we find that health expenditure has no effect for this group. Father's education may be a better indicator of the permanent income of the household. But we find no significant variation in the health expenditure effects by father's education. Overall, with the exception of scheduled tribes, it seems that the most poor (rural and uneducated) and the better off (urban) do not benefit as much as the group in the middle (rural but educated).
The pattern of income effects is not the same as the pattern of health expend iture effects (Table 5) . Indeed, in most cases, the differences are reversed.
(Negative) i ncome effects are larger for the more vulnerable groups. Recall that the effects of each of health expenditure and income are obtained conditional upon the other. This contrast between the ir distributional impact is consistent with complementarities between state health expenditure and personal attributes (education, information) that bias its effectiveness away from those individuals who need it most.
Conclusions
Infant mortality in rural India is significant ly affected by variation in state health expenditure, given state income, and the long run elasticity is -0.24. We are unable to identify a corresponding effect amongst urban households. Failing to allow for heterogeneity, lagged effects and state-specific trended unobservables results in 14 Scheduled tribes distinguish themselves from other social groups (including the SC) in having lower infant mortality rates for girls as compared to boys. This may be pertinent, although why exactly is unclear. 15 Nor do the two studies cited here. They estimate the distribution of effects under sometimes strong assumptions -discussed in Gupta et al. 2003. 19 under-estimation of the beneficial effects of health expenditure , and I have argued that this might explain some of the negative findings in the literature. The identified effect is robust to controls for state-specific rainfall shocks and other state-level variables including education, inequality and media prevalence. Although it is encouraging that it works on average, health expenditure appears to bring no benefit to some of the most vulnerable sections of society, a result that suggests complementarities between public and private (parental) inputs in the survival technology . It is widely recognised that the composition of state health expenditure is non-progressive, and that the share of public health, water and family welfare programmes in rural areas needs to be raised (section 2). The results in this paper suggest that, at the same time, it is important to educate adults in the use and the benefits of simple health-promoting technologies.
The effectiveness of health expenditure varies across the states, displaying a pattern that bears no evident relation to initial levels of mortality or income. A likely reason is that the states differ considerably in terms of initial conditions including 
The number of observations (number of live births) is 117088 in the rural sample and 35783 in the urban sample. These are marginal effects from a probit; significant coefficients are in bold. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. State health expenditure and state income are real per capita measures cast in logarithms. Every equation includes state-specific positive and negative rainfall shocks and micro-demographic controls (dummies for child gender and birth-month, age of mother at birth of the child, level of education of each of mother and father, and ethnicity and religion of the household). Table 1 . Column 2 further includes positive and negative state-specific rainfall shocks. The additional controls in Column 3 are the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural output in the state, inflation of consumer prices for agricultural and industrial workers, the log poverty headcount ratio and the log of the Gini coefficient for each of the rural and urban sectors, and a quadratic in per capita newspaper circulation. Notes: The specification estimated is that in column 3 of Table 3 . Standard errors are robust and clustered at the state level. Absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. L3 denotes the third lag of log health expenditure p.c. The reported marginal effect for income is the long run effect derived from its third and fourth lag. Elasticities are calculated at the mean for the sub-group; these means are shown in the Table. Controls include state and year effects and statespecific trends, micro-demographics and rainfall shocks. Except in the case of column 2, the sample is restricted to rural households. The last row shows the sample percentage of each sub-group. The category "Not Hindu" includes Muslim, but I further show results for Muslims alone. Higher education is defined as completion of secondary or higher. The samples are created separately for mother's and father's education. In the sample of children whose fathers have no education, 93% of mothers have no education. However, in the sample whose mothers have no education, only 51% of fathers have no education.
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